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INTRODUCTION
For at least half of the past century, America routinely conducted
surveillance flights over the People's Republic of China' in order to
gain valuable electronic and visual intelligence that is unobtainable
by the fleet of satellites orbiting in space.2 Though largely unreported
to the American public, the Chinese government recently began
sending jet fighters to shadow, or intercept, the cumbersome
reconnaissance planes? On April 1, 2001, these flights garnered
worldwide attention when an American EP-3E Aries II surveillance
plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter about seventy miles off the
coast of China.' The collision severed the nosecone from the
American plane and sent it plunging into an 8,000-foot freefall
culminating in an emergency landing at a Chinese airfield on Hainan
Island.' The Chinese plane, along with its pilot, Wang Wei, spun out
of control and was lost at sea. 6
1. See Thomas E. Ricks, Anger Over Flights Grew In Past Year: Proximnity,
Riled China; U.S. Cited Interceptors, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2001, at A I (describing
surveillance flights along the Chinese coast in early 1960); see also Steven Lee
Myers, Collision With China: The Pentagon, U.S. Tape Is Said to Show Reckless
Flying by Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at A6 (noting Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld's comments that the United States routinely conducted
surveillance flights over China for years).
2. See Ricks, supra note 1, at Al (quoting a retired naval expert that the
purpose of the surveillance flights is to obtain the electronic emissions and visual
images that satellites can not get because they can not be overhead all of the time).
3. See Neil King Jr. et al., China Refuses to Release U.S. Spy Plane. 0rew.,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2001, at A16 (indicating China's recent practice of using
fighter jets to intercept U.S. reconnaissance planes); see also Ricks, sutpra note 1,
at Al (stating that the Chinese launch their fighter jets to intercept close to one out
of every three reconnaissance flights and this rate has remained constant as the
United States increased the number of flights it has conducted).
4. See Nancy Gibbs & Michael Duffy, Bush's Big Test, TIME, Apr. 16, 2001,
at 24 (detailing the events leading up to and following the midair collision of the
two planes).
5. See Evan Thomas & Melinda Liu, A Crash In the Clouds: The Dog/ight,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 16, 2001, at 26 (describing the midair collision and subsequent
events).
6. See id. (noting that there were reports that the Chinese pilot bailed out, and
was apparently lost at sea).
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As American officials worked to obtain the release of the detained
crew and airplane, the two countries publicly blamed each other for
causing the crash.7 Meanwhile, tech-savvy American citizens, angry
over the detention of the EP-3 crew, expressed their outrage through
threats and "trash talking" over the Internet as they defaced or
vandalized at least sixty-five Chinese websites.8
In response, a group of Chinese hackers, calling themselves the
Hackers Union of China or the Honkers Union of China,' declared
war on their American counterparts." Pronouncing the week of May
1 through May 7, 2001 as "Hack the USA" week," the Honkers
7. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Collision Witth China: The Reaction; Angr'
Beijing Denounces Washington's Reports That Its Pilot Caused the Collision, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2001, at A10 (reporting the Chinese government's response to
statements made by the U.S. government that the Chinese version of events was
incorrect and the Chinese pilot had, in fact, caused the crash). The Chinese asserted
that the American plane abruptly turned into the path of the Chinese fighter,
causing the collision. See Steven Mufson & Philip P. Pan, Spy Plane Delays Irk
President; Bush Asks 'Prompt' Release by Chinese, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at
Al. The United States, however, stated that it was "inconceivable that the slower
moving, propeller-driven U.S. plane could have cut off the nimble fighter." Id.
Instead, Pentagon officials said that the evidence suggests two possible scenarios,
both of which implicate the Chinese pilot and suggest that his aggressive. "flashy"
intercept tactics brought his fighter within 10 feet of a surveillance flight in a
previous, documented encounter. See Stephen Lee Myers, Collision With China:
Washington; Chinese Pilot Reveled in Risk, Pentagon Says. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2001, at Al.
8. See Malcolm Beith, The U.S.-China Hacker Conflict, NEWSwELK, May 7,
2001, at 5 (describing the then recent Chinese cyber-attacks as retaliation for
attacks made by American hackers); see also Hackers Report a Truce, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2001, at All (reporting the 'cyberwar" between Chinese and American
hackers that began after American hackers mounted a cyber-attack in response to
the collision of the two countries' planes); see also Chris Farnsworth, U.S. -China
"Cybervar" Fallout is Felt in O.C., ORANGE COUNT'Y REG., May 9, 2001, at I
(attributing the start of the cyberwar to the "trash talk" and racial slurs American
hackers put on Chinese websites in response to the crash).
9. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Chinese Suspected of Hacking U.S. Sites; Anger
Over Plane Collision Calls for Revenge, Advice on Web Attacks, WASH. POST,
Apr. 13, 2001, at A13 (reporting the name of the group claiming credit for many of
the recent website hackings).
10. See Elizabeth Becker, F.B.L Warns That Chinese May Disrupt U.S. Web
Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2001, at A8 (stating that the F.B.I. issued a warning
that Chinese hackers might organize and increase their attacks on American
websites).
11. See Michelle Kessler, China Troubles Linked to Attacks on Web Sites Run
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Union took credit for shutting down or altering multiple government
websites, including the websites for the Office of the Clerk of the
United States House of Representatives 2 and the White House. 3 The
hackers replaced the content of one site with China's fluttering red
flag and a rendition of the Chinese national anthem that
automatically played whenever users accessed the site.' 4 Hackers
replaced other sites with tributes to Wang Wei, 5 the dead Chinese
pilot, or plastered the sites with messages such as "Beat Down
Imperialism of America" and other anti-American, pro-Chinese
sentiments.16 The hackers ended their war after claiming to have
hacked one thousand American websites. 7 Several commentators,
By U.S. Government, USA TODAY, May 2, 2001, at 6B (describing several attacks
on U.S. websites as part of an organized protest movement against the plane
collision incident as well as the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia that occurred on May 7, 1999). In addition to
encompassing the anniversary of the embassy bombing, the "Hack the U.S.A."
week also coincided with the Chinese holidays of May Day (May 1) and Youth
Day (May 4). See Riva Richmond, American Hackers Do Most Damage in China
U.S. "Cjberwar, " Dow JONES NEWS SERVICE, May 2, 2001.
12. See Lauren W. Whittington, Pro-China Hackers Hit House Clerk ' Olfice,
ROLL CALL, May 3, 2001, at 1 (detailing the damage done to the website of the
office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives).
13. See Craig S. Smith, The First World Hacker War, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2001, at D4 (describing the cyber-attacks on the White House, the California
Department of Justice, and an Eastern Ohio School District's website or computer
system).
14. See id. (describing damage done to the website of eastern Ohio's Bellaire
School District).
15. See Chinese Hackers Invade 2 Official U.S. Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2001, at A1O (reporting that one of the Department of Labor's websites was
replaced with an homage to the pilot and that two sites run by the Department of
Health and Human Services were altered and taken offline).
16. See Sam Costello, U.S., Chinese Hackers Continue Web Dejaicements,
INFOWORLD DAILY NEWS, May 1, 2001 (stating that the sites attacked by the
Chinese hackers included the U.S. Geological Survey, Eastern Region, the
Hurricane Liaison Team of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
headquarters of the Commander of the Naval Surface Force of the U.S. Atlantic
Fleet).
17. See Smith, supra note 13, at D4 (noting that the Chinese hackers called off
their attacks a day after China's Communist Party newspaper called the attacks
"unforgivable"); see also Robert MacMillan, Chinese Crackers Call Off C'rusade,
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, May 9, 2001 (reporting the announcement by the
Chinese hackers to end the attacks after reaching their goal of hacking one
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however, speculated the Chinese government was actually
responsible, even though there was nothing to controvert the Honkers
Union's claims of credit for the attacks.II
The actual identity of the perpetrators was ultimately irrelevant,
however, since there was an absence of accountability throughout the
"cyberwar" and its aftermath. 19 Individuals and groups claimed credit
for successful hacks with impunity.20 None of the articles reporting
the battle of words over the Internet mentioned any consequences or
remedies for the victims, some of whom were private companies.2'
Other than the diplomatic implications, it did not seem to matter
whether or not the Chinese government was responsible.' While the
lack of penalties, or even contemplated penalties, may be common
for such insignificant damages, 23 it raises the question of how the
United States would respond if the damage was worse or the targets
more vital.24 For example, what if Chinese hackers crippled the air-
thousand U.S. websites, including sites run by the Inter-American Defense Board,
the Federal Highway Administration, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
18. See U.S./China Tit-for-Tat Hacks Escalate, NEWSWIRE (VNU), May 1,
2001 (noting risk management firms such as iDefense were releasing reports
suggesting that the attacks on U.S. websites were state-sponsored since the
Chinese government controls so much of its citizen's access and use of the
Internet); see also Becker, supra note 10, at A8 (indicating some American
officials, including a member of the advisory board of the National Security
Agency, believed the attacks were abetted by the Chinese government). But see
Ted Bridis, U.S., Chinese Hackers Infiltrate Web Sites, Trade Insults Across
Pacific in "Net War, " WALL ST. J., May 1, 2001, at B6 (citing U.S. officials as
stating there was no evidence of coordination by the Chinese government).
19. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (describing the "'cyberwar"
but making no mention of any sort of penalties or legal actions).
20. See e.g., Carrie Kirby, Click and Bicker: U.S. and Chinese Hackers Erplain
Their Online War of Words, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 2001, at B I (interviewing four
anonymous hackers, two American and two Chinese, involved in the "cyberwar").
21. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 8 (describing the damage done to a
website of a local manufacturer of soaps and beauty products).
22. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 10, at A8 (suggesting Chinese government
involvement with no mention of the consequences).
23. See Kirby, supra note 20. at B I (stating that the "online spat" between
American and Chinese hackers "left little real damage in its wake").
24. Compare id. (reporting the victims of the "cyberwar" to be "a few
government sites in both countries and a number of small, obscure businesses,"
including the Bubbles carwash in Houston and Jianlong Decorative Materials
Factory in China's Guangdong province) with Andrea Stone, Cyberspace is the
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traffic controller computer systems at major U.S. airports," or
disabled the computers running the New York Stock Exchange?2"'
Given the potentially catastrophic consequences, the identity of thc
perpetrator, as well as the need to bring that perpetrator to justice, is
of paramount importance. This is especially vital when an attack on a
critical U.S. infrastructure by a foreign government could ultimately
result in war.27
This Comment analyzes the different legal responses available to
the United States and its citizens to different levels of Chinese21
cyber-attacks, ranging from website vandalism by Chinese
individuals, to organized attacks on vital U.S. systems orchestrated
by the Chinese government in lieu of a traditional military
confrontation. Part I describes the different types of attacks, their
consequences, and some of the instruments used to achieve them. In
addition, Part I establishes and defines the four different types of
attacks. Part II examines the available legal responses to each type of
attack. This analysis includes a review of U.S., Chinese, and
international law in terms of how each treats computer crimes and
Next Battlefield U.S., Foreign Forces Prepare for Conjlict Unlike Any Be/bre,
USA TODAY, June 19, 2001, at Al (contending that serious cyber-attacks on the
United States could include, among other things, instruments that would shut down
power grids in major cities, and flood the Hoover Dam).
25. See M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready For the Injbrmnation Age?,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1935, 1939 (1996) (offering the Federal Aviation
Administration's air-traffic control system as a potential and vulnerable target for a
computer attack).
26. See Michael Specter, The Doomsday Click, NEW YORKER, May 28, 2001,
at 110 (commenting on the potential for terrorists to wage economic warfare by
unplugging the Federal Reserve system from Wall Street).
27. See generally Todd A. Morth, Note, Considering Our Position: Viewing
Information Waifare as a Use of Force Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 567 (1998) (arguing information warflare, or
attacks on information networks should be treated as a use of force internationally
prohibited under section 2(4) of the U.N. Charter). If the attack is severe enough,
the victim is entitled to respond in self-defense, establishing a course of action that
could culminate in war. See infra notes 154-169 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of force in self defense); see also Warren P. Strobel et al., A
Glimpse of Cyberwatfare, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 13, 2000, at 32 (citing
a Russian general, through a senior CIA official, that equated the cffects of' a
cyber-attack on a transportation or electric grid to those of a nuclear blast).
28. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (detailing the reasons for
focusing the discussion on attacks originating from China).
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attacks. Finally, Part III recommends specific improvements that
could better protect and police both private and government
computer systems in order to prevent and respond to these types of
attacks.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTERNET AND HACKING
The Internet, which began as an obscure military experiment in
1968,29 has become so entrenched in society that by 1999, nearly
sixty-eight million Americans had either been online or used the
Internet. 3 Unfortunately, along with this widespread use and
dependence comes widespread risk and liability." Although the
Internet and computers revolutionized most of America's
infrastructure, they also placed that infrastructure at considerable risk
to a debilitating computer attack.12 In addition, the explosion of
29. See Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States Mav Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117,
119 (1997) (describing the rapid growth and expansion of the Internet from its
beginnings as a military experiment). The Internet, as it is known today, arose from
ARPAnet, the result of a project by the then Advanced Research Projects Agency
to build a computer network resilient to physical attacks or malfunctions in part of
the system. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S
INFRASTRUCTURE; THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 16-17 (1997) [hereinafter PCCIP Report],
available at http://vww.ciao.gov/PCCIP/PCCIP-Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 18,
2001).
30. See Frank J. Cilluffo et al., Bad Gu's and Good Stuff: When and Where
Will the Cyber Threats Converge, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 131, 140 (1999/2000)
(citing various statistics indicating the rapid growth and widespread use of the
Internet, including the fact that nearly ninety percent of large companies and
seventy-five percent of small companies now use local area networks for their
businesses).
31. See, e.g., PCCIP Report, supra note 29, at 9 (predicting that nineteen
million individuals worldwide will have the skills to launch a cyber-attack by
2003).
32. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 896 (1999) (citing a theoretical list of "Top 10" Information
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computer technology increased the tools available for criminals to
commit crimes such as theft and fraud.33 While there are many
computer related offenses,34 this Comment focuses on hacking-the
illegal entry into a computer system 35-and the havoc and
destruction a hacker can cause.
Computer hacking is becoming more widespread and no longer
requires an advanced education, as demonstrated by the hacking wars
over the EP-3 incident.36 Step-by-step hacking instructions are easily
obtainable on the Internet.37 While hacking into another computer is
generally considered trespassing in the United States and carries its
own punishments under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA"),38 most experts are more worried about the damage the
Warfare targets including the electric switch system handling all federal funds and
transactions, the electrical switch system that manages all telephones, the Internet,
the time distribution system, and the Panama Canal). In addition, the list includes
the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the Air Force satellite
control network, the Strait of Malacca-which is the major maritime link between
the Europe-Arabian peninsula and the Western Pacific and East Asia-the Alaska
pipeline, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. See id.
33. See, e.g., Laura J. Nicholson et al., Computer Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 207 (2000) (examining various types of computer crimes and applicable laws
and statutes).
34. See generally John T. Soma et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer
Crimes: Are New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 317, 331-59
(1997) (detailing different categories of computer related offenses ranging from
child pornography and pedophilia to hacking and computer theft).
35. See id. at 346 (defining hacking as involving illegal entry into a computer
system).
36. See Specter, supra note 26, at 115 (describing the ease with which it is
possible to hack into a computer).
37. See id. at 120 (demonstrating how, with a few clicks of the mouse on a
cyber-caf6 computer, the author was able to create a virus as destructive as the
Kournikova virus). Meanwhile, the hackers the author was interviewing were
accessing the database of the Los Angeles Police Department as well as gathering
the names and credit card information from the largest Internet-service provider in
the Netherlands. See id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) (responding to Congress' need to regulate the
Internet). After several amendments and rewrites, sections of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act ("CFAA") were amended by the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491-94
(1996); see also Soma et al., supra note 34, at 347-48 (discussing the CFAA as it
relates to unauthorized access to a computer, and stating that the punishment for
pure trespass can be up to six months in prison in some countries). See generallv,
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hacker can cause after gaining access, rather than the hack itself. 9
The damage usually results from the release of rogue programs
distributed by the hacker such as viruses,40 worms,4 ' time (or logic)
bombs,42 or Trojan horses,4 3 each of which have the potential to
completely disable an individual computer or an entire computer
system.44
B. WHY CHINA?
The easy availability of the tools needed to instigate a cyber-
attack, namely a computer and a modem, mean that an attack could
originate from literally any place in the world by any person in the
Nicholson et al., supra note 33, at 212-16 (analyzing the offenses under the
National Information Infrastructure Protection Act ("NIIPA")).
39. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 349 (detailing the ways a hacker can
damage a computer or system once inside).
40. See id. (defining a virus as a computer program with the potential to spread
between computers without human intervention by using each newly infected
computer to replicate itself). Viruses can be benign and may, for example, cause
the computer to display a ridiculous message, or the virus can be malignant and
alter or destroy programs and data on the infected computer. See iW.
41. See id. at 350 (defining computer worms as programs that crawl through
infected computers, occupying valuable storage space by repeatedly copying
themselves, which can potentially crash the system): see also Robert J. Malone &
Reuven R. Levary, Computer Viruses: Legal Aspects, 4 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 125,
135 (1994) (describing the IBM Christmas card worm that started in West
Germany, crossed the Atlantic, and eventually caused the three-day closing of
IBM's internal mail system).
42. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 350 (describing both time bombs and
logic bombs as viruses that lay dormant until a specific time). The difference
between the two bombs is that time bombs are executed at a pre-set date, while
logic bombs are triggered by the occurrence of a predetermined event. See i.; see
also Malone & Levary, supra note 41, at 136-38 (detailing a time bomb, the
Israeli, or Friday the 13th Virus, that was programmed to erase all the files in the
infected computer on Friday, May 13, 1988, as well as a logic bomb, the Scores
Virus, that activated whenever it discovered proprietary information of a certain
company and proceeded to erase all of that information).
43. See Malone & Levary, supra note 41, at 139 (explaining Trojan horses as
benign programs that contain hidden and destructive programs). An example of a
Trojan horse would be a program for a chess game that also contains a hidden
virus, so that whenever the innocuous chess game is downloaded, the virus is
spread. See id.
44. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 349 (describing the damage rogue
programs can cause to computers).
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world.45 While many of the broader, theoretical issues implicated in a
discussion of computer attacks remain constant regardless of the
perpetrator,46 many of the decisions regarding an appropriate
response are dictated by the specific circumstances surrounding the
attack.47 With this in mind, this Comment concentrates its discussion
on attacks originating from a single country in order to offer a
practical application and perspective.4"
Specifically, this Comment focuses on China because of the
unique issues surrounding Sino-American relations,4' as well as the
relevance of such a discussion to recent events." Since the brutal
suppression of pro-democracy protesters in China's Tiananmen
Square in 1989, the relationship between the United States and China
has reached a point of "deep, mutual ambivalence" bordering on
45. See Schmitt, supra note 32, at 897 (dubbing computer attacks "war on the
cheap" and citing one expert as claiming that with one million dollars and twenty
individuals he could "bring the U.S. to its knees"); see also Michael J. Robbat,
Note, Resolving the Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Information War'are in
the International Forum: The Reach of the Existing Legal Framework, and the
Creation of a New Paradigm, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 10, 8 (2000) (presenting
computer attacks as the "great equalizer" for militarily inferior nations and
groups). Thus, the threat of computer attacks is greatly magnified clue to the low
cost and wide availability of the tools needed to conduct such an attack. See i1.
46. See, e.g., infra notes 154-177 and accompanying text (describing the
implication of the law of conflict management and what factors are considered in
determining an appropriate and legal responsive use of force).
47. See, e.g., infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text (setting forth the
difficulties the United States would encounter in arresting a computer hacker
residing in a country with which the United States does not have an extradition
treaty).
48. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (acknowledging that while
many of the issues regarding a computer attack may be the same, any response to a
computer attack will be dictated by the specific circumstances surrounding that
attack, especially the different nations involved). For example, an attack
originating from a perpetrator in England would warrant a much different response
and involve different issues than would an attack from a perpetrator in China,
primarily because of the absence of an extradition treaty with China. See in/hia
notes 91-92 and accompanying text (explaining the implications for the United
States of not having an extradition treaty with China).
49. See generally infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (detailing the
unique situation between China and the United States).
50. See supra notes 1-27 (describing the surveillance plane incident between
the United States and China, and subsequent website defacements exchanged over
the Internet between the citizens of these two countries).
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distrust.' China's continual rapid growth in the past twenty years,
both economically and militarily,52 means that the United States is
still not certain whether it faces an emerging superpower that
challenges U.S. security and economic interests, or a reform-minded
developing country. 3 Similarly, China is equally ambivalent towards
the United States. They understand that the United States is
important for their development, yet also an obstacle to their
ascension as an international power." China is eager to engage in
constructive, bilateral relations with the United States, but at the
same time is deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions toward China and
any increase in U.S. global influence."5 China's size, Security
Council membership, nuclear capabilities, massive economy and
military strength, and its increased diplomatic presence, requires that
the United States interact with China '6 Unfortunately, the terms of
51. See DAVID M. LAMPTOM, SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS: MANAGING
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, 1989-2000 16 (2001) (discussing the seminal events since
1989 that have shaped the current relationship between the United States and
China, and describing that relationship as being dominated by ambivalence and
possible distrust).
52. See CHEN JIAN, THE CHINA CHALLENGE IN TIlE T\INTY-FIRST CFEN'URY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1 (1998) (commenting on China's rapid
growth and describing it as nothing short of phenomenal).
53. See Richard H. Solomon. Foreword to CHEN JIAN, TIlE CIIINA CHALLENGE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, at vii
(1998) (indicating U.S. uncertainty toward China). This dilemma is often
characterized as whether the United States is facing a "'China Threat" or a "China
Challenge." See JIAN, supra note 52. at 1.
54. See Current and Projected National Securit
" 
Threats to the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Select Conmm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 58 (2001)
(statement of Thomas Fingar, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research) (responding with the word "'ambivalent" to a question regarding the
attitude of Chinese leaders towards the United States). See generall' El DAOYU,
The View From China, in PREPARING AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THi 2 1sT
CENTURY 43, 44-46 (David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins eds., 1999)
(articulating China's view of the United States).
55. See Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet as
Prepared for Deliveir Before the Senate AIrmed Services Committee Hearing oil
Current and Projected National Security Threats, in CYBER TERRORISM AND
INFORMATION WARFARE II: U.S. EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL PE-RSPEc(TIVES
77, 84-85 (Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam eds., 1999) (testifying about
the threat China poses to the national security of the United States).
56. See A Reexamination of U.S.-China Relations: IHearing Bejbre the
Subconn. on E. Asian and Pac. Aff of the S. Conmi. on Foreign Relations, 106th
2002]
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that relationship are still unclear.17 Thus, a discussion of a cyber-
attack originating from China becomes especially interesting because
of the ambivalence already surrounding relations between the two
countries. 8
In addition, focusing the current discussion on cyber-attacks from
China has a certain relevance in light of the incidents subsequent to
the collision of the American EP-3 surveillance plane and Chinese
fighter jet. 9 Furthermore, China is one of a limited number of
countries whose military is specifically exploring the incorporation
of computer attacks into their broader military doctrine and
strategy.6 ° In fact, the Chinese government has gone so far as to
contemplate the development of a fourth branch of their military
Cong. 3-4 (1999) (statement of Hon. Stanley 0. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) (indicating that China's circumstances require
that the United States deal with China by stating that "[i]t is not a question of
engaging or not engaging").
57. See generally JIAN, supra note 52, at 16-23 (detailing the difficulties faced
in defining Sino-American relations); John T. Rourke & Richard Clark, Making
U.S. Foreign Policy Toward China in the Clinton Administration, in AFTER TIIF,
END: MAKING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 201 (James
M. Scott ed., 1998) (describing the challenges faced by the Clinton Administration
in formulating a foreign policy towards China); Henry A. Kissinger, The
Architecture of an American Foreign Policy for the Twenty-first Centuty
, 
in
PREPARING AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 54, at
299, 302-03 (discussing America's foreign policy into the twenty-first century,
with special attention to the challenges associated with China); Zbigniew
Brzezinski, A Geostrategyfor Eurasia, in PREPARING AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 54, at 309, 3 14-16 (setting forth a foreign
policy strategy for relations with European and Asian countries, especially China).
58. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (elaborating on the issues
surrounding U.S.-China relations).
59. See supra notes 1-27 and accompanying text (describing the surveillance
plane incident and the trading of website defacements and insults over the Internet
between Chinese and American citizens prior to the release of the American crew).
60. See National Communications System. Office of the Manager, The
Electronic Intrusion Threat to National Security and Emergency Preparedness
(NS/EP) Telecommunications: An Awareness Document, in CYBER TERRORISM
AND INFORMATION WARFARE I: ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES 343, 384 (Yonah
Alexander & Michael S. Swetnam eds., 1999) (including China, along with Russia,
South Korea, Cuba, Japan, Germany, France, Iraq, Israel, and Bulgaria, as a
country currently incorporating computer attacks into its military strategies and
doctrine).
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dedicated to computer and Information Warfare ("1IW"). 61 In
addition, they are recruiting civilian hackers and training them at
Army schools to create a cadre of "cyber warriors. 6 - Analyzing
cyber-attacks originating specifically from China offers a more
focused and practical discussion with real world application and
relevance as well as one permeated with interesting, difficult, and
unique issues in terms of feasible American responses to cyber-
attacks.63
C. TYPES OF ATTACKS
Naturally, the list of feasible responses depends on the nature of
the initial attack, with different attacks implicating different types of
responses.64 One of the distinguishing features between the different
types of attacks is whether the attacker is a private citizen or acting at
the direction of a government.65 This distinction is critical because it
determines which body of law controls any subsequent response.' A
response made by a State against a non-state actor, especially a
private citizen, is generally a law enforcement matter.67 Thus, if the
non-state actor is not a citizen of the responding State, and therefore
not subject to that State's jurisdiction, the responding State must
comply with current bilateral and multilateral extradition and legal
61. See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text (describing China's
dedication to the use of computer attacks as a viable military option).
62. See infra note 178 and accompanying text (highlighting China's efforts to
strengthen its computer capabilities in terms of military strategy).
63. See generally supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text (explaining the
reasons for focusing this Comment specifically on cyber-attacks originating in
China).
64. Compare infra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing the
available legal responses to a cyber-attack on a non-vital target by a private
citizen), with infia notes 178-194 (analyzing the available legal responses to a
cyber-attack instigated by a nation-state against a vital target).
65. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (presenting the differing
controlling laws as determined by whether or not the attacker is a state actor).
66. See infra notes 67-72 (setting forth the two different bodies of law that
would control any response depending on the relationship of the attacker to his
host nation).
67. See WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND TIlE USE OF FORCE 8
(1999) (indicating that a state's use of force against a non-state actor is an issue
handled through law enforcement measures).
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assistance agreements.68 On the other hand, a State responding to the
actions of another State is controlled by international law."
Assuming the initial computer attack damages its target, the
responding State's actions are controlled by the internationally
recognized law of conflict management.7" If the response involves
the use of force, the law of armed conflict7' is also implicated.72
The target of the attack is another distinguishing feature that
determines the types of available responses." Under international
law, use of force by one nation against another may not be of such
duration, scope, or intensity as to justify a responsive use of force.7"
In this sense, the target systems of a cyber-attack can be
characterized as vital or non-vital targets to help determine the
severity of a response.7 5 Vital targets are those computer systems
related to the five critical infrastructures identified by the President's
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection ("PCCIP"),"'
68. See id. (noting that a state action against a non-state actor must be
addressed through extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements).
69. See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 52
(1998) (stating that international law has historically been concerned with relations
between states).
70. See SHARP, supra note 67 at 7 (defining the law of conflict management as
that body of law that "defines and governs the use of force between [Sitates during
peacetime"). The law of conflict management remains in place and is applicable
even when the law of armed conflict is implicated. See id.
71. See id. (describing the law of armed conflict as being the body of law that
governs state action and conduct during hostilities).
72. See id. (setting forth the relationship between the law of conflict
management and the law of armed conflict).
73. Compare infi'a notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing the
responses available to an attack on a non-vital target by a private citizen), with
inf!a notes 120-44 and accompanying text (describing the responses to an attack on
a vital target by a private citizen).
74. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 7 (indicating that the scope, duration, and
intensity of a use of force determine whether an armed conflict exists as a matter of
law).
75. See infia notes 77-79 and accompanying text (distinguishing between vital
and non-vital targets).
76. See PCCIP Report, supra note 29, at iii (identifying the members of the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which was charged
with assessing the nation's vulnerability to computer attacks and recommending
protective measures).
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charged with assessing the nation's vulnerability to computer
attacks.77 The Commission determined that the United States has five
critical infrastructures-Information and Communications, Physical
Distribution, Energy, Banking and Finance, and Vital Human
Services-whose incapacity or destruction would cripple the United
States's defensive or economic security."8 For the purposes of this
discussion, an attack on a vital target is considered an attack on any
combination of these five infrastructures, and an attack on a non-vital
target is considered an attack on any target not associated with these
five infrastructures.79
This Comment, therefore, focuses its discussion on computer
attacks on either vital or non-vital targets perpetrated by either
private Chinese citizens or the government of China."0 The Comment
assumes that any attack or virus completely debilitates the target
system.81 Furthermore, the Comment assumes that the identity of the
77. See id. at A-i (defining the five critical infrastructures).
78. See id. (setting forth the five critical infrastructures whose incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on U.S. defense or economic security);
see also Brian A. Persico, Under Siege: The Jurisdictional and Interagency
Problems of Protecting the National Iformation Infrastructure, 7 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 153, 156-60 (1999) (discussing threats to the critical components of
the National Information Infrastructure, as specified by the PCCIP Report, and
elaborating on what each broad category entails). Telecommunications includes
telephone networks, Internet, and personal computers. See il. at 157. The Energy
Infrastructure refers to electric power systems, and oil and gas refining and
transmission facilities in the United States. See id. at 160. The Banking and
Finance infrastructure includes banks, financial services companies, payment
systems, investment companies, and securities and commodities exchanges. See hi.
The Physical Distribution infrastructure encompasses the vast network of
highways, rail lines, ports, pipelines, inland waterways, airports and air traffic
control systems found throughout the United States. See id. at 158-59. The Vital
Human Services infrastructure consists of the water supply, emergency services,
and government services of the United States. See id. at 159.
79. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (presenting the significance
of the target in terms of determining an appropriate response within the boundaries
of the applicable laws).
80. See supra notes 45-79 (describing the significance of attributing the attacks
to China, as well as the importance of distinguishing between state actors, non-
state actors, vital targets, and non-vital targets).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A) (setting the required damage amount to a
minimum of five thousand dollars). The assumption that the attack completely
debilitates the target system is made in order to avoid complications arising from
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attacker is obtainable82 and that the attacker is either the Chinese
government or a Chinese citizen.83 Thus, this Comment analyzes the
legal options available to the United States in response to each of the
following types of computer attacks: an attack on a non-vital target
by a private Chinese citizen;84 an attack on a vital target by a private
Chinese citizen;85 an attack on a non-vital target by the Chinese
government;86 and an attack on a vital target by the Chinese
government.87
II. ANALYSIS: COMPUTER ATTACKS AND THE
AVAILABLE LEGAL RESPONSES
A. PRIVATE CITIZEN HACKER
1. Non- Vital Target
If a Chinese citizen-hacker spreads a virus that erases all files on
an infected computer, and that virus spreads throughout the United
States, infecting as much as fifty percent of the nation's personal
the satisfaction of this subsection of the CFAA. See also infra text accompanying
note 95 (defining "damage" under the CFAA).
82. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1071-72 (2001) (elaborating on the difficulties in tracing a hacker, which
may be the greatest challenge). Unlike traditional crime, the range of suspects in
cyberspace crime is enormous. See id. at 1071. If any "electronic footprints" can be
found, investigators may be able to follow them through various servers, but those
footprints usually end with fake email addresses on servers that do not carry any
subscriber information; thus, resulting in a dead end. See id. at 1072.
83. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text (indicating the significance
of attributing the attacks to the Chinese for the purposes of this discussion).
84. See infra notes 88-1 19 and accompanying text (analyzing computer attacks
on a non-vital target by a private Chinese citizen).
85. See infra notes 120-144 and accompanying text (assessing the responses
available to a computer attack on a vital target instigated by a private Chinese
citizen).
86. See infra notes 144-178 and accompanying text (discussing computer
attacks made by the Chinese government on non-vital American targets).
87. See infra notes 178-195 and accompanying text (describing attacks on vital
targets made by the Chinese government).
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computers,88 there are few legal recourses available to the victims.8 9
Prosecuting an American citizen-hacker for spreading a virus
throughout the United States is difficult enough,9 but the absence of
an extradition treaty with China renders the prosecution of a Chinese
citizen-hacker in U.S. courts nearly impossible. 9'
The American citizen-hacker could be prosecuted for damages
caused, as well as the knowing transmission of a program that causes
damage,92 under several subsections of the CFAA 3 Congress drafted
section 1030(a) of the CFAA, for example, to specifically address the
type of computer crime described in the hypothetical at the beginning
of this section. 94 Depending on how the hacker transmits the virus,
the hacker could also be liable under section 1030(a)(5)(A) of the
CFAA, which prohibits the knowing transmission of a program to
intentionally cause damage95 to a protected computer.9 The
88. See PCCIP Report, supra note 29, at 9 (estimating the number of targeted
personal computers to be five hundred million by 2001).
89. See infra notes 90-119 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of
the United States to bring to justice any Chinese citizen-hacker).
90. See Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177 (2000) (analyzing the various U.S. laws
applicable to different computer crimes); see also Nicholson et al., supra note 33
(describing various federal laws proscribing computer crimes).
91. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON, LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF TilE AGREEMENT
WITH HONG KONG FOR THE SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 105-3, at iii (1997) (noting the absence of an extradition treaty between the
United States and the People's Republic of China).
92. See Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 90, at 224-26 (discussing the CFAA as it
applies to malicious viruses).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (presenting the punishment for offenses committed
under the CFAA).
94. See Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 90, at 224 (discussing Congress' intent in
drafting section 1031 (a) of the CFAA).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (defining "damage" as 'any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information that (A) causes
loss aggregating at least S5,000 in value during any one-year period to one or more
individuals; (B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the
medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more individuals; (C)
causes physical injury to any person; or (D) threatens public health and safety").
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2). The statute defines a "'protected computer" as:
[A] computer (A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the
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maximum penalty for such an offense is five years in prison. 7
With a Chinese citizen-hacker, however, one of the most difficult
tasks would be to bring the hacker to the United States to face trial. '
In Factor v. Laubenheiner,99 the Supreme Court held that the legal
right for a country to demand extradition of another country's citizen
exists only when it is created by treaty.' Because the United States
does not usually enter into treaties with countries it considers to be
repressive,'0 there is no extradition treaty with China," 2 and thus, no
legal ground to demand the extradition of a Chinese citizen-hacker to
face an American judge. 03  While the United States could
conceivably ask for extradition absent a treaty, the United States'
inability to comply with the reciprocity " for which China would
United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for
the financial institution or the Government; or (B) which is used in interstate
or foreign commerce or communication.
Id.
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (establishing the guidelines for punishment for
violation of the statute); see also Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 90, at 244-25
(applying section 1030(c)of the CFAA to various virus attack scenarios).
98. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the absence of an
extradition treaty between the United States and China).
99. 290 U.S. 276 (1933) (examining extradition with respect to U.S. law and
treaties to which the United States is a party).
100. See id. at 287. The Court interprets international law to hold that:
While a government may, if agreeable to its own constitution and laws,
voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the
country from which he had fled, and it has been said that it is tinder a moral
duty to do so, the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative
duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist only when created by
treaty.
Id.
101. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 270 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that "the United States does not
commonly conclude treaties with repressive countries").
102. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting the absence of an
extradition treaty between the United States and the People's Republic of China).
103. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (attributing the legal
authority to extradite to an extradition treaty between two countries).
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3183-3184 (1948) (indicating that by law, the United
States cannot extradite one of its nationals without a treaty or convention).
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undoubtedly ask, would probably mean the Chinese would deny the
request. 05
Another possible method for bringing the citizen-hacker to justice
in the United States is through extralegal seizure. 11 In United States
v. Alverez-Machain, "7 the Supreme Court held that a federal court
did not lose jurisdiction over a suspect because that suspect had been
abducted from Mexico and brought to the United States for trial
without resorting to the extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico. 08  Thus, U.S. officers, private individuals, law
enforcement officers, or military units could mount an operation to
abduct the hacker from China in order to bring him to justice in the
United States. 0 9 While this approach is a legal option, the
international and diplomatic ramifications of an extralegal seizure
would be so dramatic, that it renders the possibility merely an
academic exercise. I10
Even though no damages can be awarded, some American victims
might take comfort in the fact that the Chinese citizen-hacker could
be convicted in China."' However, a conviction will only take place
105. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 322 (discussing the doctrine of
reciprocity as it applies to extradition treaties). Historically, before the emergence
of formal treaties, extradition generally worked on a reciprocal basis. See id. at
320. Without a formal treaty, and ignoring, for the moment, the other numerous
foreign policy implications, the United States could, in theory, ask the People's
Republic of China for the extradition of the hacker. However, China would then
likely ask for the extradition of an American, a request with which the United
States could not comply. See 18 U.S.C §§ 3183-3184 (prohibiting the extradition
of an American citizen without an extradition treaty in place).
106. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Ciberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 39
(1996) (discussing the possibility of extralegal seizure to circumvent the absence
of an extradition treaty).
107. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
108. See id. at 669-70 (permitting the prosecution of a defendant apprehended
through extralegal seizure in spite of an existing extradition treaty).
109. See Perritt, supra note 106, at 39 (describing the means by which an
extralegal seizure may be conducted).
110. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 8-9 n.14 (commenting that a use of force by a
victim State against a non-state actor in the sovereign territory of another State
without that State's consent could be considered an unlawful use of force against
that State by the victim State).
111. See infra notes 112-120 (examining the conditions under which a Chinese
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in Chinese courts if the hacker's virus spreads to Chinese
computers." 2 The People's Republic of China ("P.R.C.") added
computer crimes to the P.R.C. Criminal Code in 1994, 1 " making it a
crime to delete, alter, or disturb the operation of a computer
information system so that it does not operate properly." 4 A serious
offense is punishable by up to five years in prison, and an
"exceptionally serious" offense is punishable by no less than five
years. "5 In addition, the Chinese government proscribed the deletion
of, alteration of, or addition to, programs installed in, or processed
and transmitted by, a computer system." 6 They also have prohibited
the intentional writing or dissemination of computer viruses or other
destructive programs that interfere with the normal operation of a
computer system."17 Unfortunately, the United States cannot force the
Chinese to prosecute the hacker, nor can it force an extradition of the
citizen-hacker." 8 Thus, while the United States and China both have
relevant laws, there is no mechanism in place to ensure that those
laws are applied to the citizen-hacker attack scenario.' "9
2. Vital Target
The United States is equally restricted in its available responses
citizen-hacker would be prosecuted in China).
112. See THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art.
286 (Wei Lou trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1998) [hereinafter P.R.C.
Criminal Code] (criminalizing the distribution of a computer virus to Chinese
computers).
113. Computer Security i Chhia, 7 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 10, Jul. 15, 1998
(reporting the addition of computer crimes to the P.R.C. Criminal Code).
114. See P.R.C. Criminal Code, supra note 112, art. 286 (prohibiting the
deletion, alteration, or disturbance of the operation of a computer information
system).
115. See id. (setting forth the penalty for an "exceptionally serious" offense).
116. See id. (criminalizing any manipulation of computer programs installed in,
or processed and transmitted by, computer systems).
117. See id. (proscribing the creation and distribution of any destructive
computer program).
118. See supra notes 88-117 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties
the United States faces in attempting to bring a Chinese citizen-hacker to justice
under U.S. or Chinese law).
119. See id. (discussing the current American and Chinese laws concerning
computer crimes).
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for redress if the Chinese citizen-hacker were to cripple any one of
the United States' critical infrastructures. 20 While the effects of such
an attack could be catastrophic,' 2' the United States is largely
paralyzed in its response because the culprit is a private citizen, and
therefore, any response is a law enforcement issue.' - As such, the
absence of an extradition treaty with China'23 again significantly
limits the retributive responses available to the United States
government and the victims. 1
24
Regardless of the specific vital target or the damage that occurs, if
a computer attack is attributable only to a private citizen and no
connection or sponsorship by any State is determined, the attack
must be considered a criminal matter.'25 Like a computer attack on a
non-vital U.S. target by an American citizen-hacker, -'2 6 an attack on a
vital U.S. target would be controlled by the CFAA.' 2 7 The statute
specifically deals with computer-related threats to national
security. 128 In addition, the statute prohibits the causation of damage
120. See ifra notes 121-144 and accompanying text (setting forth the available
legal remedies to an attack on a vital target by a Chinese citizen-hacker); see also
supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (defining vital targets).
121. See Strobel et al., supra note 27, at 32 (equating the potential destruction a
debilitating computer attack could cause to a nuclear explosion).
122. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 8 n.14 (noting that while a non-state actor and
a state actor may cause identical damage to a State's infrastructure, any action
conducted by a non-state actor remains a law enforcement issue).
123. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of
an extradition treaty with China and the resulting difficulties in attempting to bring
a Chinese citizen before an American court).
124. See id. (articulating the United States's available responses to a cyber-
attack from a Chinese citizen-hacker).
125. See Lawrence T. Greenberg et al., Information Iarfare and International
Law ch. 3 (1998) (describing the options available to a State victimized by a
crippling computer attack perpetrated by a single individual as unsettled and
potentially unsatisfactory because of the necessity of treating the incident as a
criminal matter and the subsequent reliance on international treaty law), available
at http://www.dodccrp.org/iwilchapter3.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
126. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing the possible legal
responses available to an attack on a non-vital target by an American citizen-
hacker).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (describing the targets that are vital to the U.S.
government).
128. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 352 (indicating subsection (a)(l) of the
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through the spread of computer viruses or other programs.' The
same frustrations accompanying the attempted prosecution of' a
Chinese citizen-hacker of a non-vital computer system would also,
unfortunately, accompany any attempt to prosecute a Chinese citizen
hacking a vital U.S. target. 30 It would be quite difficult to prosecute
the hacker because of the absence of' an extradition treaty with
China.'31
Even if there was an extradition treaty between the People's
Republic of China and the United States in force, it is doubtful that
an extradition would occur.'32 Most extradition treaties include a
political offense exception,' 33 which stipulates that a requested party
will not grant extradition if the offense is considered a political
offense or connected to a political offense.'34 China may view the
actions of its citizen-hacker as a critique of the American capitalistic,
democratic government and, therefore, consider it a political offense,
absolving the Chinese government of any responsibility to extradite
the citizen-hacker. 35
If an attack caused considerable damage other than the mere shut
down of a computer system, such as a plane crash resulting from a
CFAA as the subsection primarily regulating computer-related threats to national
security).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (proscribing the "knowing ... transmission of a
program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct.
intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected computer");
see also supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the
CFAA).
130. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discussing the resulting
difficulties in attempting to bring a Chinese citizen before an American court).
131. See id. (commenting on the absence of an extradition treaty between China
and the United States)
132. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 353 (declaring that extraditions based on
national security rarely occur because the infractions are usually considered
political offenses and thus fall within the political offense exceptions that are
written into the treaties).
133. See Greenberg et al., supra note 125.
134. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 327 (describing the political offense
exception, but also noting that a recent trend by European countries is to eliminate
the exception because they view it as a defense for international terrorism and hate
crimes).
135. See id. (discussing the implications of the political offense exception).
[ 17:64 1
CYBER-A 77:.ICKS FROM CIII.NA-
failure in the air-traffic control system, the United States could
categorize the incident as a terrorist attack. 3 The international
pressure to extradite a terrorist far exceeds any pressure to extradite
common criminals. 3 7 This increased pressure is due in large part to
the perception that the State refusing the extradition request
sponsored or encouraged the terrorist act. 38 In this case, China will
want to avoid implication because the complete refusal of a State to
cooperate in the suppression or prevention of such hostile acts could
be considered state-sponsorship of the action ipso facto."'3 This in
turn would invoke the law of conflict management,"' which
authorizes the use of force in self-defense.'' China and the United
States, two nuclear powers, would then be exchanging hostilities on
the dangerous brink of war. 142 Barring an agreement by the Chinese
government to extradite the citizen-hacker, the United States is once
again faced with very limited avenues of recourse for a debilitating
computer attack on one of its vital computer systems when the
attacker is a private citizen of China.' 43
136. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 14 (commenting on the international legal
implications of computer-related terrorist attacks); see also Greenberg et al., supra
note 125 (noting the international pressures and implied complacency associated
with refusing an extradition request for the suspect of a terrorist act).
137. See Greenberg et al., supra note 125 (discussing the international pressures
that coincide with an extradition request for a terrorist suspect).
138. See SHARP, supra note 67. at 8 n.14 (indicating that a failure to prevent or
suppress a terrorist act could be perceived as sponsorship of that act, which could
then implicate a self-defense response).
139. See id. (describing the possibility that state-sponsorship of a terrorist act
constitutes a use of force by that State which could warrant a response of the use of
force in self-defense).
140. See id. at 7 (defining the law of conflict management).
141. See id. at 8 n.14 (indicating that the law of conflict management permits the
use of force in self-defense under certain circumstances and with certain
limitations).
142. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Russia Seeks 5-Nation Talks On Reducing Nuclear
Arms, WASH. POST, July 7, 2001, at A19 (reporting that China and the United
States both have nuclear weapons).
143. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 53 (declaring the current legal paradigm,
regarding computer attacks originating on foreign soil, as "vague" and an
insufficient deterrent in discouraging such computer attacks).
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B. STATE-SPONSORED ATTACKS
1. Non- Vital Target
Recently, a computer worm called "Code Red" swept across the
globe in two different waves.44 The first wave infected nearly two
hundred and eighty thousand computers, causing the Pentagon to
temporarily block public access to its website, and the White House
to change its numerical Internet address as a precautionary
measure.'45 A second wave spread a new variant of the worm a week
later and infected over one hundred and fifty thousand computers."''
Among the second wave's victims were several of Microsoft's MSN
Hotmail servers and the servers of the Associated Press.'47 The worm
144. See Nicole C. Wong, 'Code Red' Creeping Worldwide, WASH. POST, Aug.
2, 2001, at El (reporting the spread of the second incarnation of the Code Red
computer worm across the globe). Among its victims were the Pentagon, which
had to install patches on many computers and had to take some websites offline to
continue the work. See id. The worm traveled through the Internet by placing
software code on unprotected business computers that then sent it to other
machines that were typically the powerful server computers. See id. The worm
itself also instructed other computers to flood certain websites with requests for
data, overwhelming them and preventing legitimate users from accessing them. See
id.
145. See Pentagon Web Sites Blocked; Threat of 'Code Red' Computer Worn'
Prompts Safeguards, WASH. POST, July 24, 200 1. at A5 [hereinafter Pentagon Web
Sites Blocked] (describing the spread of the first Code Red virus that infected over
two hundred eighty thousand computers and was the fastest spreading worm in
history). Among the more high profile victims was the Pentagon, which
temporarily blocked public access to its websites. See id. In addition, the White
House was forced to change its Internet address as a precautionary move. See id.
146. See Wong, supra note 144, at El (describing the second incarnation of the
Code Red worm).
147. See Nicole C. Wong, Worm Sneaks Up on Firmns Urging the Public to
Download Fix, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001, at E2 (detailing the victims of "Code
Red II"). In its second life, the Code Red virus infected many companies that had
been urging the public to protect against it. See id. Microsoft Corp., which
developed the software patch to protect against the worm, had some of its server
computers infected by the bug. See id. The Associated Press, which had filed
dozens of updates on the spread of the virus, was infected as well. See id. Many of
those updates were delayed as the virus upset the timely posting of them to the
organization's website. See id. In addition, many of the employees lost Internet
access until the servers were repaired and went back online. See id.
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defaced websites with the words "Hacked by Chinese."'4
Although no one has taken credit for the "Code Red" attack,'4 9 if a
private citizen is responsible for the hack, then the incident is a law
enforcement issue with international implications.' If, however, the
Chinese government was the perpetrator, the incident would be
governed by the international laws controlling the relationships
between States.' 5' The imposition of these international laws avoids
many of the extradition obstacles that hamper any legal pursuit by
the United States of a Chinese citizen-hacker.' Unfortunately, the
responses available to the United States remain unclear because of
the ambiguity of the applicable international laws that apply to
computer attacks. 53
In the hypothetical scenario, envisioning the Chinese government
as the perpetrator of the "Code Red" attack, since damage was
intentionally inflicted by one sovereign nation within the territorial
boundaries of another nation, the international law of conflict
management is implicated.'54 As such, the United States' response
would be dictated by the provisions of the United Nations Charter
("U.N. Charter"), which defines and governs the use of force, both
148. See Pentagon Web Sites Blocked, supra note 145, at A5 (describing the
damage caused by the worm).
149. See Wong, supra note 144, at El (reporting a lack of indication regarding
the worm's origin).
150. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 8 n.14 (arguing that all "'hostile, transnational
activities in CyberSpace" are either independent of state-sponsorship and thus a
crime to be addressed by national and peacetime treaty law, or state-sponsored and
thus a use of force governed by the law of conflict management and the law of
armed conflict). Of course, even if state-sponsorship were proven, the actual
hacker could still be tried under the criminal laws. if he could be extradited. See
supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text.
151. See SHARP, supra note 67. at 8 n.14 (indicating that the involvement of a
nation-state implicates international laws governing relations between States).
152. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing the near
impossibility of bringing a Chinese citizen to justice in the United States because
of the lack of an extradition treaty between the two countries).
153. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that the legality of any particular
response to a computer attack is unclear under the current international law
framework provided by the U.N. Charter and other treaty law).
154. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 7 (declaring the law of conflict management
to govern the use of force during peacetime).
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during peacetime and armed conflict.'55 Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity of another nation, 56 unless it is conducted pursuant to a
nation's right to self-defense or authorized by the U.N. Security
Council.'57 In addition, the prohibition on the use of force
encompasses both military and non-military force, in an
acknowledgment that non-military force can cause the same damage
and destruction as conventional military force.' Therefore, China's
state-sponsored computer attack, so long as it intentionally causes
damage, would most likely be considered a use of force prohibited
by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.'59
Although the perpetrator, rather than the target or amount of
damages, dictates the controlling law--national and treaty law for
155. See id. at 6-7 (discussing the relationship between the peacetime regime of
international law, the law of conflict management, and the law of armed conflict).
156. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (proclaiming "[a]ll members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations"); see also SHARP, supra note 67, at 33
(explaining the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force).
157. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 34 (declaring that any State's use of force is
unlawful under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter unless that action is an exercise of
the State's inherent right of self-defense, as codified in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, or is authorized by the Security Council "under its coercive Chapter VII
authority"). Article 5 1 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
158. See SHARP, sup-a note 67, at 101 (declaring that the use of force
prohibition covers "'physical force of a non-military nature' committed by any
state agency") (quoting BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 113 (1994)).
159. See id. at 101-02 (demonstrating how a state activity in cyberspace that
intentionally causes any destructive effect within the sovereign territory of another
State is an unlawful use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4)).
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private citizens or the international law of conflict management for
states 16 -the opposite is true in measuring an appropriate
response. 16 A response to the use of force by a State is generally
controlled by the severity of the initial use of force .62 In the case of a
cyber-attack on a non-vital U.S. target that causes minimal physical
destruction, the attack will most likely be considered an illegal use of
force. 163
The scope, duration, and intensity of such a cyber-attack, however,
would not be sufficient to qualify it as an armed attack.' 6' If the
attack is not considered an armed attack, then it is doubtful that the
use of force would be authorized under the United States' right to
self-defense, 65 because the right to respond in self-defense is
predicated on an armed attack. 166 In addition, a state's right to use
force in self-defense is controlled by the principles of necessity 67
160. See id. at 8 n.14 (noting that all types of cyber-attacks, regardless of the
target, are either non-state-sponsored, and thus a criminal matter to be resolved
through national and peacetime international treaty law, or state-sponsored and
controlled by the international law of conflict management and the law of armed
conflict).
161. See id. at 103 (stating that even if the intentional destructive action is
considered a use of force, it may not contain the intensity or severity to be
considered an armed attack deserving of a corresponding use of force in self-
defense).
162. See id. (noting that the intensity and severity of the initial attack determines
the appropriate response in terms of whether to use force and if so, how much).
163. See id. (positing that any action by one nation that intentionally causes
damage in another is an unlawful use of force).
164. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 55-67 (describing the threshold point of an
armed attack at which the use of force is justified as an exercise of a State's
inherent right to self-defense in terms of scope, duration, and intensity).
165. See id. at 103 (noting that response to an incident that causes minimal
damage and does not constitute a continuing threat may very well be considered an
unlawful use of force, but does not qualify as an armed attack, and thus does not
implicate a victim State's right to use force as self-defense).
166. See Schmitt, supra note 32, at 920 (arguing that an armed attack and not
just the use of force is what triggers a State's fight to respond with force in self-
defense).
167. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 38 (stating that the law of conflict
management requires that a State's use of force be necessary for its self-defense).
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and proportionality, 68 among others, and is prohibited for retaliatory
or punitive purposes. 69
A response in kind by the United States, such as the release of a
similar virus in China, could be viewed as a retaliatory or punitive
use of force. 7' Such an attack would be prohibited by international
law because it would not be in response to the equivalent of an
armed attack.'' The United States could appeal to the U.N. Security
Council, which is authorized under Article 39 of its Charter,' to
respond with force to any event that threatens peace, even if the
event does not meet the threshold of an armed attack.'73 Barring
168. See id. (requiring "that a State's use of force be proportional in intensity
and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary to promptly secure the permissible
objectives of self-defense.").
169. See id. at 37-39 (discussing the principles that control a State's use of force
in self-defense).
170. See id. (stating that customary international law prohibits the use of force
for retaliatory or punitive actions).
171. See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text (illustrating the
parameters within which a responsive use of force may take place).
172. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (stating "[t]he Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security"). Articles 41 and 42 describe the sanctions available to the Security
Council to maintain or restore peace and security, which include complete or
partial interruption of economic or diplomatic relations and military actions. See
U.N. CHARTER arts. 41 and 42. The United States and China are both permanent
members of the Security Council and thus have vetoes over any action the Security
Council takes. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL 107 (2d ed. 1998). Because both countries would be parties to the dispute
for which the proposal for pacific settlement would be offered, they would be
required to abstain from voting as set forth in Articles 27(3) and 52(3) of the
Charter. See id. at 224. Article 27(3) states that "[d]ecisions of the Security
Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a
dispute shall abstain from voting." U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3). Article 52(3) states
that "[t]he Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement
of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security
Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 52(3).
173. See Schmitt, supra note 32, at 920 (noting that a determination that a
specific act does not constitute an armed attack to which a responsive use of force
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action from the Security Council, the United States' official
unilateral responses are limited.' If early detection and other
preventive measures'75 fail, the United States may be able to ask for
reparations for any damage done as well as publicly disclose the
Chinese government's role in the computer attack to cause
international embarrassment. 176 Ultimately, the legality of any action
the United States takes is questionable because there are no current
laws or international agreements, especially between the United
States and China, which deal explicitly with this type of computer
attack. 17
7
is justified does not leave the international community remediless). Thus, a State
victimized by an isolated attack that does not amount to an armed attack could not
respond to it with force on its own accord, but if the Security Council determined
the act to be a sufficient threat or potential threat to international peace and
security, then the Security Council could authorize a response. See id. at 929.
174. See supra notes 144-173 (analyzing the remedies the United States has as a
State in response to an attack by China). Private citizens could, of course, exact
their own revenge by unleashing a virus in China or hacking into the computers of
Chinese citizens or the Chinese government and be relatively free of prosecution.
See supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing the paucity of remedies
available to a U.S. victim of a Chinese hack). For the same reason that U.S.
citizens are largely remediless if victimized by a Chinese hacker, so too would a
Chinese citizen be largely remediless if victimized by a U.S. hacker. See id.
175. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 130 (describing the appropriate remedies to
the unlawful use of force in the form of a computer attack that falls short of
justifying a use of force response).
176. See id. at 130 (proposing public disclosure and subsequent embarrassment
to the offending State as appropriate responses to computer attacks that do not pose
instant and overwhelming need for anticipatory self-defense); see also Schmitt,
supra note 32, at 290 (declaring that a computer attack that falls short of an armed
attack but nonetheless violates the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force
would subjugate the offending State to "international opprobrium"). It is important
to note that these responses, especially the public disclosure for embarrassment
purposes, are theoretical and focus on what international law permits. See supra
notes 45-63 and accompanying text. This Comment focuses on the available legal
responses and not whether these responses are good policy. See id. Actual
responses to a computer attack originating from China would obviously need to be
determined in the much broader context of U.S. foreign policy and the already
complex and difficult relationship between the two countries. See id.
177. See Bowman, supra note 25, at 1945 (discussing the agreement by the G-7
Ministerial Conference to find solutions to the computer attack problem, which
falls far short of any binding or controlling law).
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2. Vital Target
Hoping to put the skills of its amateur hackers to use, China's
People's Liberation Army recently began recruiting civilian hackers
and training them as "cyber warriors" at military schools.'78 In fact,
China places such emphasis on the ability to wage Information
Warfare'79 it is openly contemplating the development of a fourth
branch of its armed services dedicated to IW. ' The United States is
also beginning to focus on IW.' s' Military computer technicians
employed by the United States Defense Information Systems Agency
are being trained to defend against hostile computer attacks from
other countries, as well as launch their own attack against an
adversary's computer systems.5 2 As a policy tool, computer attacks
on vital national infrastructure targets might be as effective, if not
178. See Cilluffo et al., supra note 30, at 151 (describing a call in the Liberation
Arin,' Daily, the official newspaper of the People's Liberation Army, to recruit
civilian hackers in order to facilitate the ability to wage war over the Internet).
179. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 5 (defining "Information Warfare" as tile
"employment of computers and related technology to attack computer networks
linked to a nation's civilian, military, and/or government information-based
resources."). This is a narrower definition for 1W than the frequently cited Air
Force definition, which characterizes IW as "[a]ny action to deny, exploit, corrupt,
or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against
those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions." Ronald R.
Fogleman & Sheila E. Windnall, Cornerstones of" In/brmation Warfaire, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, available at http://vww.af.mil/lib/corner.htIl
(last visited Nov. 7, 2001 )
180. See Bill Gertz, China Plots Winning Role in Cvberspace: Mililar, Paper
Cites Need for 'Paralyzing' Internet Software, WASH. TiMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at A I
(noting that the Liberation Arn ' Daily, the official newspaper of the People's
Liberation Army, contained an article calling for the establishment of a "net force"
as an additional military branch).
181. See Andrea Stone, Cvbe-space is the Next Battlefield: U.S., Foreign Forces
Prepare for Conflict Unlike Any Bejbre, USA TODAY, June 19, 2001, at I A
(reporting on the United States' involvement in IW plans).
182. See id. (commenting on the emergence of cyberwarfare as one of the most
significant national security threats and discussing measures the United States has
taken to protect against it). In addition, Pentagon officials have commented on the
vast computer warfare arsenal they have developed. See id. Although officials will
not comment on what comprises this arsenal, most analysts agree that it probably
includes various computer viruses, logic bombs, worms and Trojan horses. See id.
Officials are most concerned with the ability to focus attacks on strategic targets in
order to avoid civilian casualties in the event an attack actually occurs. See id.
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more effective, than conventional attacks." 3 In fact, many predict the
next international conflict between two technologically advanced
countries will involve computer attacks.' 4
As noted earlier, once it is determined that a State, or state agent,
is responsible for an action that causes damage in the territory of the
victim State, the victim's response is controlled by international law
of conflict management and the law of armed conflict.' In the case
where the state-sponsored attack is directed against a vital computer
system, 8 6 the damage is likely to be of such magnitude so as to
qualify the attack as a use of armed force."5 7 This then triggers the
victim State's right to respond with force in self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.' The response must, of course,
183. See id. at 2A (reporting that some countries, recognizing their inferior
military strength to the United States, view IW as an alternative approach that
could level the playing field). As such. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
ranks IW as one of the gravest threats to national security. See Stone, suipra note
181, at 2A; see also Robbat, supra note 45, at 9 (discussing the appeal IW holds to
smaller nations as a means to overcome battlefield inferiority).
184. See Stone, supra note 181. at 2A (quoting Dan Kuehl, a teacher of
Information Warfare at the National Defense University who predicts "'[tlhe next
time you see a major conflict between two technologically advanced opponents,
you're going to see computer network attacks"). In fact, U.S. officials admit to
already having used computer attacks. See id. During the Gulf War, U.S.
warplanes emitted jamming signals that interfered with the Iraqi air-defense
computers' ability to target allied aircraft. See id. In addition, during the war in
Kosovo in 1999, U.S. officials considered electronically siphoning the bank
accounts of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. See id. They opted not to out of
concerns for the legality of the operation. See id.
185. See supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text (indicating that any
response to an attack orchestrated by a State is controlled by international law of
conflict management and the law of armed conflict).
186. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (delineating what the United
States considers to be its vital infrastructures and computer systems).
187. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 138 (indicating that when **an activity not
traditionally considered an armed attack is used in such a way that it becomes
tantamount in effect to an armed attack," it will generally be considered an armed
attack).
188. See id. at 36 (setting forth that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes the
right of all nations to defend against unlawful, aggressive use of force); see also id.
at 130 (stating that when a threat to a vital national interest, such as the one posed
by a computer attack on the computers that maintain the safety and reliability of
the nuclear stockpile, is detected, the victim State is legally permitted to respond
with necessary and proportional force in an act of anticipatory self-defense).
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comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality, but can
be in the form of traditional military force, or a response in kind."'8
Although a response in kind, or even a response through traditional
military capabilities may be legal, 90 it means that the world's two
most powerful nations are exchanging hostilities.' 9'
The available legal responses to full-scale computer attacks by one
nation against another are still somewhat ambiguous, but are
nonetheless broadly controlled by the U.N. Charter.'92 Even if
clarified, the controlling laws are merely placing parameters on the
conduct of war. 93 The restrictions on, and deterrence of, an initial
attack should be clarified in order to avoid a subsequent response. ' 94
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ADDRESSING THE VULNERABILITIES
One of the easiest ways to avoid the ambiguities and difficulties
surrounding the available legal responses to computer attacks is to
189. See id. at 38 (discussing the principles of necessity and proportionality, as
well as noting that any self-defense response is prohibited from being retaliatory or
punitive).
190. See supra notes 156-189 and accompanying text (setting forth the legality
of a use of force by one nation as a self-defense response to a use of force by
another nation).
191. See Richard Bernstein & Ross Munro, The Coning Conflict with America,
FOREIGN AFF. Mar./Apr. 1997, 18, 21-22 (describing China as rapidly becoming
the globe's second most powerful nation and the next chief rival to the United
States).
192. See SHARP, supra note 67, at 33 (indicating the U.N. Charter clearly
outlaws the aggressive use of force).
193. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 53 (indicating the absence of any deterrent
force to the use of IW in international law).
194. Compare supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text (analyzing the
responses available to the United States in the case of a computer attack on a non-
vital target with a request for economic reparations being the most severe), with
supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text (describing the most severe response
to a computer attack on a vital target as culminating in a war between the two most
powerful nations in the world). See also Robbat, supra note 45, at 53 (arguing that
the current international legal paradigm lacks sufficient deterrents to discourage
debilitating computer attacks).
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avoid the need to respond altogether.' 95 Adequate protective
measures, as well as deterrent measures,196 negate the need to
respond because they prevent an attack from causing any damage in
the first place. 97 Thus, the United States should first address its
vulnerabilities to hacks of any kind.' 98
To protect the nation's vital computer systems, the United States
must recognize computer attacks as emerging threats on the same
level as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.'" The U.S.
government should direct appropriate resources to preventing
computer attacks. 200 Appropriately, President Clinton signed
Presidential Decision Directive 62 ("PDD-62")20' and Presidential
195. See discussion iInra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefits of protective and deterrent measures).
196. See Col. James P. Terry, USMC (Ret), Responding to Ittacks On Critical
Computer Infrastructure: What Targets? JJ'hat Rules of Engagement?, 26 NAVAL,
L. REV. 170, 184 (1999) (noting that the importance of recognizing cyber-terrorism
as a strategy that does not follow any traditional military patterns is the realization
that deterrence is thus the only credible response).
197. See, e.g., Wong, supra note 144, at El (describing a patch issued by
Microsoft to protect computers from the Code Red worm). More than a million
users downloaded the patch. See id. As such, no customer lost any data. See id.
198. See, e.g., supra note 193-194 and accompanying text (stressing the need to
emphasize deterrence).
199. See Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comnn on Gov't Aff., 104th Cong. 5 (1996) (prepared
statement of Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman) (indicating that the protection of
the county's computer networks should be of vital concern).
200. See Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld Mulls Two Options: Status Quo or 10%
Military Cut, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at A4 (identifying computer attacks,
along with terrorism and the proliferation of missiles in the Third World, as the
preeminent emerging threats to be addressed by the new military strategy being
devised by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld). The Secretary's recently released
military strategy for the Twenty-First Century, entitled "Terms of Reference," calls
for new computer warfare abilities and places defense against computer attacks
and computer warfare as one of the military's primary functions. See id. In
addition, the Pentagon has asked for a five hundred percent increase in funding for
the Defense Information Systems Agency, from S3.1 million to S18.6 million in
2002, in order to better guard the military's 2.5 million computers. See also Stone,
supra note 181.
201. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on
Presidential Decision Directive 62, (May 22, 1998) [hereinafler Fact Sheet on
PDD-62] (announcing the signing of PDD-62, which creates the Office of the
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-
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Decision Directive 63 ("PDD-63")0 2 in May of 1998 in an effort to
implement the recommendations of the PCCIP Report.""1 These two
directives collectively form the foundation of the government's
efforts to protect the country's vital infrastructures." The directives
created the Office of Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter-Terrorism 25 and the National Infrastructure
Protection Center ("NIPC") at the FBI.2"6 This is a collaborative
effort between government agencies and the private sector to combat
the threat of computer attacks on vital U.S. computer systems.2 11 It is
thus important to ensure that this initiative remains a top priority and
is allocated the appropriate resources to ensure its ability to respond
to the growing number of threats against the United States's vital
computer systems. 20 8
Terrorism), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2001).
202. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on
Presidential Decision Directive 63, (May 22, 1998) [hereinafter Fact Sheet on
PDD-63] (specifying the Administration's broad policy outlined in PDD-62 and
creating the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI")), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddl-63.htl
(last visited Sept. 18, 2001). The NIPC incorporates representatives from the FBI,
the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Transportation, the United States Secret
Service, and the Intelligence Community, as well as the private sector, to
coordinate the Federal Government's actions with regard to threats on the National
Infrastructure. See id.
203. See Persico, supra note 78, at 165-66 (analyzing PDD-62 and PDD-63).
204. See id. at 166 (stating that PDD-62 and PDD-63 form the foundation of the
government's endeavor to protect the vital infrastructures).
205. See supra note 201 (announcing the creation of the Office of the National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism through
the signing of PDD-62).
206. See supra note 202 (indicating the creation of the National Infrastructure
Protection Center ("NIPC") at the FBI through the signing of PDD-63).
207. See Persico, supra note 78, at 166 (discussing the purposes of PDD-62 and
-63); see also Cyber-attacks: The National Protection Plan and its Privacy
Implications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology. Terrorism, and
Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 20 (2000)
(statement of John S. Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office)
(elaborating on the government's progress in implementing the National Plan set
forth in PDD-63).
208. See Cyber-attack: Improving Prevention and Prosecution: Hearing Blebrc
the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Infoirmation of the S.
Comnmn. on the Judiciay, 106th Cong. 68-69 (2000) (statement of Guadalupe
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Furthermore, network administrators for non-vital computer
systems would greatly benefit from attending a seminar on protecting
computer networks from attack. -0 9 Some of these seminars are run by
major U.S. corporations such as Ernst and Young and are offered in
growing numbers.210
B. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. The Lone Hacker
If the preventive measures prove inadequate and a computer attack
occurs, the current legal framework is inadequate to respond.' 1 The
lack of an agreement with China, whether a bilateral extradition
treaty or a multilateral international agreement, prevents an action to
seek legal redress from a lone Chinese citizen-hacker, regardless of
the importance of the victimized computer system.212 Similarly, the
lack of any international agreement explicitly addressing computer
Gonzalez, Special Agent In Charge of the FBI's Phoenix Field Office) (testifying
that the NIPC needs more than double the current number of field investigative
personnel but that the program was not, at the time, slated for any budgetary
increases).
209. Compare Kevin McCoy, Execs Become Hackers to Learn ttow to Stop
Snoopers, USA TODAY, June 19, 2001, at 6B (reporting on the growing number of
seminars aimed at teaching defensive skills to protect computer networks from
hackers), with ifr-a notes 200-208 and accompanying text (discussing steps the
government is taking to protect its computer systems, as well as those private
industry systems included in any of the vital national infrastructures). Many
corporations are now spending upwards of five thousand dollars per person to send
their top computer executives to these types of seminars. See McCoy, supra, at 6B.
The seminars are generally five days long and consist of nine hour days dedicated
to hacking. See id. In the hopes of learning the skills needed to protect their
company's computer systems, the students try to hack into a computer network
created by the instructors for this very purpose. See id. As one instructor noted, -it
helps if you think like your opponents and try to anticipate what they might do."
Id.
210. See McKoy, supra note 209, at 6B (describing the hacker prevention
seminars).
211. See discussion supra Part 11 (discussing the difficulties the United States
would have in pursuing a legal course of action in response to a computer attack
originating in China).
212. See discussion supra Part II (A) (discussing the available remedies to a
computer attack on both a vital and non-vital computer network from a private
Chinese citizen).
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attacks between nations creates an equally ambiguous legal course of
action for any victim nation.2"3
The United States could enter into a mutual prosecution agreement
with China in order to facilitate the prosecution of, and possibly
secure the potential for economic damages from, a private Chinese
citizen who hacks into and damages either a vital or non-vital U.S.
computer system.21 4 Such an agreement would be a pledge by both
countries to bring to justice, through their own judicial system,
hackers that cause damage in the other's country, as opposed to a
mutual legal assistance treaty215 into which the United States would
be unwilling to enter with China. - 6
Ideally, the international community will come to some sort of
agreement on computer attacks and crimes.2 7  Both the United States
and China would benefit more from a multilateral agreement rather
than a bilateral agreement.2 8  A multilateral agreement would be a
greater deterrent and a more reliable framework for seeking
damages.- It would protect both the United States and China from
213. See discussion supra Part 11 (B) (examining the inadequacy of the current
international legal framework in addressing computer attacks by one country
against another).
214. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: DEFINITION, NATURE AND SCOPE § 302
reporter's notes 2 (1987) (stating that "there is no principle either in international
law or in United States constitutional law that some subjects are intrinsically
'domestic' and hence impermissible subjects for an international agreement").
Thus, there is nothing preventing the two countries from legally coming to some
sort of cooperative agreement, given the unlikelihood of the two countries ever
agreeing to an outright extradition treaty. See supra note 10 1.
215. See, e.g., Treaty with Russia on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, June 17, 1999, U.S.-Russ., S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-22 (binding the two
countries into a mutual legal assistance treaty which involves mutual cooperation
on such procedures as service of process, extradition, and criminal investigation).
216. See HENKIN, supra note 101, at 270 (indicating that the United States does
not enter into treaties of any sort with countries it considers repressive).
217. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 363 (arguing for a convention relating to
the extradition of computer criminals).
218. See infi-a notes 219-221 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
a multilateral agreement over a bilateral agreement).
219. But see Senator Jesse Helms, Floor Statement (Apr. 26, 2000) [hereinafter
Statement of Jesse Helms] (expressing America's reluctance to enter into
agreements that do not bind the countries about whom America is most worried by
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computer attacks originating anywhere in the globe, rather than only
from each other.220 The agreement will also serve as another vehicle
for China's increased participation in the international community.'-"
The two most promising incarnations of such an agreement take
the forms of a multilateral extradition agreement - and the creation
of a neutral arbitration body.22 3 A multilateral extradition agreement
would bind all signatories under one broad framework of extradition
law.224 This serves to provide uniform extradition requirements and
an agreement on extraditable crimes. -5
Alternatively, the United States and China could, along with the
rest of the international community, agree to submit to the
jurisdiction of a neutral arbitration body, such as the International
Court of Justice26 or the International Criminal Court. " This would
stating that any treaty then President Clinton negotiated with Russia regarding the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would be "dead on arrival" because of threats from
China, Iraq, and North Korea, who were not signatories).
220. See, e.g., infra note 224 and accompanying text (indicating the broad,
binding authority a multilateral agreement could have on a large number of
signatories).
221. See Robert S. Ross, Beijing as a Conserative Power, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.
13, 1997, 33, 41 (listing the various international organizations into which the
United States should invite China, thus indicating China's relative lack of
involvement in international organizations).
222. See in'ia notes 224-225 and accompanying text (discussing a multilateral
extradition agreement).
223. See hifra notes 226-228 and accompanying text (presenting the issues
associated with the creation of, and submission to, a neutral international
arbitration body).
224. See Soma et al., supra note 34, at 363 (arguing for a convention relating to
the extradition of computer criminals).
225. See id. at 363-64 (elaborating on the specifics of a proposed multilateral
extradition agreement). Although the convention would involve numerous
countries, the United States may still be reluctant to agree to terms that would turn
its citizens over to repressive governments. See HENKIN. supra note 101, at 270
(noting the United States does not enter into extradition treaties with countries it
considers repressive).
226. See Perritt, supra note 106, at 106 (indicating that some scholars suggest
expanding the role of the International Court of Justice to include jurisdiction over
international crimes).
227. See id. at 106-07 (proposing the International Criminal Court as an
appropriate venue for international computer crime cases).
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provide uniformity in the treatment of transnational computer crimes
and ensure that no crime goes unpunished.2 2, Admittedly, such
agreements are rather idealistic, 29 and it may, unfortunately, take a
devastating cyber-event to spur the international community into
adopting such sweeping pro-active measures.23 °
2. Controlling State Actions
Many of the same difficulties associated with reaching an
international agreement or understanding on the treatment of cyber-
crimes perpetrated by private citizens are also present in any
discussion concerning the hostile use of computers by states.' I A
bilateral agreement with China condemning the use of computer
attacks would only protect the United States and China from attacks
by each other. However, this would not protect either country from
the rest of the world.232 Thus, if either country enters into an
international agreement, that agreement needs to include as many
nations as possible.233
In order to avoid many of the difficulties associated with the
negotiation of a new international agreement,234 the United States and
China could work together to clarify an already existing agreement-
228. But see id. at 224-28 (presenting the numerous difficulties associated with
the creation of an international arbitration body for cyber-crimes, not the least of
which is the absence of unifornity of standards for the treatment of cyber-crimes).
If nothing else, an international agreement of this sort could better deter the hacker
who would have to conceal his actions from the combined signatories'
investigatory powers, rather than just one or two countries. See i.
229. See, e.g., Statement of Jesse Helms, supra note 219 (demonstrating the
difficulty in reaching binding, multilateral agreements on difficult issues).
230. See Cilluffo et al., supra note 30, at 136-37 (lamenting the fact that it is a
tenet of human nature to believe that which has not happened cannot happen).
231. See supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text (assessing the
complexities in reaching an international agreement on cyber-crimes).
232. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 9 (dubbing IW "the great equalizer" lbr
smaller nations attacking adversaries with superior conventional military
capabilities).
233. See supra note 219 (using the failure of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to
demonstrate the necessity of binding as many nations as possible to such an
agreement in order to gain ratification of the agreement).
234. See supra notes 217-233 and accompanying text (indicating the difficulties
associated in creating binding international agreements).
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the U.N. Charter.235 The U.N. could definitively declare computer
attacks as an armed use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter.236 This erases some ambiguity surrounding the issue
and is not difficult to accomplish, because it does not involve the
creation of any new organizations. 237 In addition, it clarifies the
course of action the victim nation can take in accordance with
international law.238
While this clarification may deter states from conducting computer
warfare,239 the certainty of the response hopefully serves as the
ultimate deterrent.240 Somewhat similar to the mutual assured
destruction theory of preventing nuclear war, a clear policy that
computer attacks are met with the severest responses, both
conventionally and electronically, serves to outweigh potential
benefits that arise from instigating the initial computer attack.24
CONCLUSION
The increased growth of, and dependence on, the Internet
revolutionized the transfer of information. -42 At the same time, it
235. See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text (presenting the possibility
of unequivocally including cyber-attacks within the meaning of Article 2(4)'s
prohibited use of force in the U.N. Charter).
236. See Morth, supra note 27, at 590 (arguing that the use of the IW should be
considered a use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter); see also
Robbat, supra note 45, at 56 (proposing the U.N. agree that IW invokes Article
(2)4 as well as Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
237. See supra note 217-233 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges
inherent in the creation of binding international agreements and international
bodies).
238. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 55 (stating that IW currently circumvents
international law because of definitional ambiguity, rather than a lack of relevant
provisions).
239. See Morth, supra note 27, at 588 (arguing that Article 2(4) impacts the
conduct of states, thereby refuting the proposition that international law is largely
ignored due to the absence of any coercive power).
240. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 62 (stating that any new legal paradigm
designed to prevent the use of IW will only succeed if it contains sufficient
repercussions that outweigh any potential benefits of conducting the IW).
241. See id. (noting that a lack of accountability will "encourage increased and
reckless use of W").
242. See Bowman, supra note 25, at 1937 (asserting that the National
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added another tool to the vast arsenal of instruments available for
criminals to pursue their nefarious deeds. 43 In addition, computer
use in criminal activities significantly complicates the law
enforcement agent's task of identifying criminals and especially
apprehending them.244 This is especially true when the search is
international. 45 In the hands of a technologically advanced military,
the Internet becomes a new weapon, potentially as powerful and
disruptive as a nuclear explosion. 46
Since the United States is one of the most technologically
advanced nations, 47 it is also one of the nations most vulnerable to
an incapacitating attack on its information infrastructure.2 '
Nonetheless, the current legal structure is ill-suited to provide
adequate remedies to a victim of a computer attack that originates
outside the borders of the victim's country, regardless of the severity
of the attack, the identity of the victim, or even the identity of the
perpetrator. 249 The same American computer systems that are
Information Infrastructure, including the Internet, gives the average citizen a
means of global access and personal participation rivaled only by the town
meeting).
243. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 82 (discussing the plethora of computer related
crimes including unauthorized disruption and identity theft, as well as traditional
crimes using a computer, such as child pornography, copyright infringement,
cyberstalking, and illegal firearms sales).
244. See id. at 1071-72 (describing the many difficulties encountered in
attempting to identify a computer hacker).
245. See id. (discussing the problems associated with identifying a hacker); see
also Perritt, supra note 106, at 2-3 (analyzing the jurisdictional, venue, and choice
of law difficulties found in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes, as
illustrated by the situation where a person in Mexico writes a defamatory message
about a Norwegian that is read by someone in Israel through a U.S. server).
246. See Strobel et al., supra note 27, at 32 (equating the potential destruction of
a debilitating computer attack to a nuclear explosion).
247. See Robbat, supra note 45, at 14 (commenting on the United States'
heightened vulnerability to computer attacks). The United States' status as one of'
the most technologically advanced nations also means that it is one of the nations
most dependent on information technology. See id.
248. See id. (delineating the seriousness of the threat of a cyber-attack on the
United States).
249. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing the legal responses available to the
United States in the event of a computer attack from any system originating in
China).
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vulnerable to a coordinated military computer attack are just as
vulnerable to a lone hacker.25 0 The available responses to each type
of attack are equally ambiguous, especially if the attack originates
from China. 5
The United States must make concerted efforts to address its
vulnerabilities and protect its computer systems from damaging
attacks. 2  An attack repelled by a defense mechanism already in
place negates the need to respond at all. 2 3 Therefore, adequate
resources must be provided for this defensive effort, as well as
training with the most up-to date information to keep abreast of the
rapidly evolving hacker world.254 If an attack happens to penetrate
the initial defenses, there must be multilateral international
agreements in place that explicitly detail the potential course of
action for victim nations if the attack was instigated by another
country.255 Similarly, there must be codified multilateral international
agreements providing for the prosecution of a computer hacker who
perpetrates an attack against another country.256 The Internet's
blurring of international lines makes the need for international
cooperation that much more critical, if, for no other reason than pure
self-preservation, now that any nation can be brought to its knees
with the single click of a mouse.
250. See Stone, supra note 181. at I A (noting that computer technicians for the
Defense Information System Agency are protecting defense computers from
foreign countries as well as hackers).
251. See discussion supra Part II (analyzing the legal responses available to the
United States in the event of a computer attack originating in China on any U.S.
computer).
252. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
preventive measures to secure the country's computer systems against attacks).
253. See id. (describing various protective measures).
254. See id. (citing the resources needed to protect computer systems).
255. See Morth, supra note 27, at 590 (arguing that 1W should be considered a
use of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter); see also Robbat, supra
note 45, at 56 (proposing the U.N. agree that IW invokes Article (2)4 as well as
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
256. See supra notes 214-228 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a
multilateral international agreement on the prosecution of hackers).
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